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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The State of Amestonia and the Federal Republic of Riesland appear 
before the International Court of Justice in accordance with Article 40(1) of 
its Statute through submission of a special agreement for resolution of all the 
differences between them concerning the Frost Files. This Court has 
jurisdiction over the dispute pursuant to Article 36(1) of its Statute, as both 
parties have agreed that this Court will adjudicate the dispute under its ad 
hoc jurisdiction. The parties concluded this special agreement and 
Compromis in The Hague, The Netherlands and jointly notified this Court of 
their special agreement on 1 September 2015. 
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QUESTIONS PRESENTED 
The State of Amestonia respectfully requests the Court to adjudge: 
I. 
Whether documents published on the website of The Ames Post are 
admissible as evidence before the Court, whether Riesland’s mass electronic 
surveillance programs against Amestonian public figures and nationals 
revealed in those documents violate international law, and whether 
Amestonia is entitled to an order directing the immediate cessation of those 
programs with assurances of non-repetition; and  
II. 
Whether the seizure and forfeiture of the VoR station and its equipment, 
and the arrest of Margaret Mayer and two other VoR employees, violated the 
Broadcasting Treaty and were in accordance with Amestonia’s other 
international law obligations; and  
III. 
Whether the detention of Joseph Kafker under the Terrorism Act 
violated international law, and whether Amestonia is entitled to his 
immediate release, the disclosure of all information which formed the basis 
of his apprehension, and the payment of compensation for his detention; and  
IV. 
Whether the cyber-attacks against the computer systems of The Ames 
Post and Chester & Walsingham are attributable to Riesland and whether 
they constitute an internationally wrongful act for which Amestonia is 
entitled to compensation. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
BACKGROUND 
Amestonia is a developing nation with a population of 20 million and 
an agrarian-based economy.  It borders Riesland, a developed country with a 
population five times that of Amestonia and a world-renowned information 
technology and communications sector. The two nations share a language 
and have enjoyed largely positive political and economic relations.  They 
have concluded a number of bilateral treaties in diverse fields of cooperation, 
among them the 1992 “Treaty on the Establishment of Broadcasting 
Facilities” (“the Broadcasting Treaty”).  The Broadcasting Treaty entitles 
each State to furnish and operate a television station in the other’s territory 
in hopes of facilitating mutual understanding and fortifying the friendship 
between the two nations. To this end, the treaty extends certain privileges 
and immunities to the stations and their employees, obligates the station’s 
employees to respect the laws of the host State and not to interfere in its 
internal affairs, and requires that the station not be used in any manner 
incompatible with the treaty. 
 
THE FROST FILES 
 The Riesland Secret Surveillance Bureau (“the Bureau”) engages in 
spying and covert activities pursuant to the Secret Surveillance Bureau Act 
of 1967 (“SSBA”).  The SSBA provides for some external oversight of the 
Bureau’s activities by other Rieslandic government bodies. In December 
2014, whistleblower Frederico Frost, a former Bureau intelligence analyst, 
fled to Amestonia and turned over numerous top-secret documents relating 
to the Bureau’s activities (“the Frost Files”) to Chester & Walsingham, a law 
firm representing him, and The Ames Post, an Amestonian newspaper. The 
Ames Post independently reviewed and published the documents on its 
website gradually over January and February 2015. Amestonia declined 
Riesland’s request for Frost’s extradition under the political offense 
exception in the countries’ Extradition Treaty. 
 
VERISMO AND CARMEN 
 The Frost Files revealed that beginning in May 2013, as part of a 
surveillance program called “Verismo,” the Bureau collected and stored 1.2 
million gigabytes of data a day from an undersea fiber optic cable that serves 
as Amestonia’s primary means of international communication.  
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The Frost Files also revealed that from its establishment in 1992 
pursuant to the Broadcasting Treaty, the Voice of Riesland (“VoR”), a 
division of state-owned corporation Riesland National Television, had 
operated as the pretext for a Rieslandic surveillance program known as “the 
Carmen Program.” Under this program, Bureau employees acting as VoR 
employees covertly collected information from Amestonian public and 
private sector leaders, including U.N. Ambassador Cornwall. These 
prominent Amestonians were invited to be guests on “Tea Time with 
Margaret,” a weekly show hosted by Rieslandic television icon Margaret 
Mayer, the government-appointed head of the VoR. While Mayer 
interviewed her guests, Bureau employees would install a rootkit malware 
known as “Blaster” on their electronic devices, allowing the Bureau full 
remote privileged access to the interviewees’ phones and computers. The 
program’s primary objective, as described in the leaked documents, was “to 
collect information concerning Amestonia’s domestic and foreign policy, in 
order to advance Riesland’s political and economic interests in the region.” 
 
THE VOR ARRESTS AND SEIZURES 
 On 16 February 2015, the day The Ames Post published the Carmen 
documents, Amestonian police applied for a warrant to seize VoR assets and 
property, citing the documents as probable cause. While the police were 
applying for the warrant, the VoR interrupted its broadcasting and replaced 
it with reruns of Teatime with Margaret. The judge thereafter granted the 
warrant. Upon execution, the police found the station unattended and seized 
the station’s property. At 3:15AM the following morning, Amestonian 
border patrol encountered three VoR employees, including Margaret Mayer, 
attempting to cross into Riesland by train. The three refused to produce their 
travel documents upon request by the Amestonian officials and were 
subsequently detained. Amestonian police then sought and obtained an arrest 
warrant for all three on suspicion of espionage. Amestonian investigators 
later determined that the confiscated property had been used for surveillance. 
The Amestonian Ministry of Justice obtained a forfeiture order against VoR 
real estate and property. Amestonia intends to sell the property at public 
auction, pending the resolution of this case. 
 
THE NEONICS CONTROVERSY 
 To boost crop yield, Amestonian farmers use a class of insecticides 
known as neonicotinoids (“neonics”) produced by Rieslandic companies. 
Following a report finding a correlation between the use of neonics and a 
dramatic decline in the region’s honeybee population, environmental 
activists began advocating for legislation to ban the production and use of 
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neonics. Some online contributors advocated for violence on the activist 
website www.longlivethehive.com. 
 On 2 February 2014, seven Amestonian warehouses were set on fire, 
killing three Amestonian nationals and two Rieslandic nationals and injuring 
many others. On 7 March 2014, Amestonian and Rieslandic government 
officials and Rieslandic businessmen received 263 envelopes of white 
powder, later determined to be non-toxic neonics. That night, an anonymous 
online tweet warned that the “threat is real” and that “next time” the envelope 
recipients would “taste [their] own poison.” On 16 October 2014, Tom 
Sivaneta, the Bureau’s Director, informed the Amestonian Minister of 
Foreign Affairs that the Bureau had identified a group of environmental 
activists planning to contaminate a honey shipment bound for Riesland with 
a toxic neonicotinoid. The next day, Riesland issued a Terrorism Alert 
pursuant to the Terrorism Act 2003. On 21 October 2014, Amestonian police 
arrested three college students—self-professed members of an environmental 
group called “The Hive”—in possession of toxic neonics and maps of 
Amestonian honey extraction facilities. Riesland reissued Terrorism Alerts 
in April 2015 and October 2015. 
 
THE DETENTION OF KAFKER 
 On 7 March 2015, shortly after the VoR arrests and Amestonia’s 
refusal to extradite Frost, Riesland detained Joseph Kafker—a 70-year-old 
retired Amestonian politician and vocal opponent of the use of neonics—
after a speaking engagement in Riesland. Pursuant to provisions of the 
Terrorism Act applying to detentions when a Terrorism Alert is in force, 
Kafker was denied, inter alia, appearance in person before the Tribunal, 
contact with his appointed special advocate, and access to the information 
providing the basis for his arrest. The Tribunal continues to extend his 
detention every 21 days, and the Supreme Court of Riesland has denied 
Kafker’s motion challenging his detention. 
 
CYBER-ATTACKS 
 On 22 March 2015, malware similar to that used in the Blaster 
program and traceable to the cyber-infrastructure of the Rieslandic 
government was used to attack the networks and communication switches at 
Chester & Walsingham and The Ames Post. As a result of the attacks, the two 
targets suffered a combined €45-50 million in damages, The Ames Post shut 
down operations for approximately two months, and a significant number of 
proceedings in Amestonian courts were delayed for months. 
APPLICATION TO THIS COURT 
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 Amestonia and Riesland have agreed to refer this dispute to this 
Court by a Special Agreement. Riesland, however, does not consent to the 
introduction of information derived from confidential documents published 
by The Ames Post. The parties have stipulated in Article 2(b) of the Special 
Agreement that the issue of the admissibility of the documents is left for this 
Court to decide. 
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SUMMARY OF PLEADINGS 
FIRST PLEADING 
The Frost Files are admissible before this Court, Riesland’s surveillance 
programs violate international law, and Amestonia is entitled to immediate 
cessation and a guarantee of non-repetition of such surveillance programs.  
This Court does not exclude evidence on the bases of reliability or 
providence. In any event, the Frost Files are of sufficient reliability and 
probative value to warrant their admission, and Amestonia did not violate 
international law in accessing and submitting them. The Frost Files and 
additional evidence prove the existence and scope of Riesland’s surveillance 
programs. These programs violated Riesland’s treaty obligations under the 
ICCPR and the Broadcasting Treaty, as they deprived Amestonian civilians 
of their fundamental human rights and contravened Amestonian law.  These 
programs further violated Amestonia’s territorial integrity and U.N. 
Ambassador Cornwall’s diplomatic immunities.  Amestonia is entitled to 
immediate cessation and a guarantee of non-repetition of Riesland’s 
programs, as Riesland continues to store unlawfully-collected Amestonian 
data and is otherwise likely to develop analogous programs.   
 
SECOND PLEADING 
Amestonia’s arrest and detention of VoR employees and seizure of VoR 
property did not violate the Broadcasting Treaty or Amestonia’s other 
international law obligations.  The immunities and privileges of the 
employees and premises terminated pursuant to Article 36 upon the station’s 
use as a pretext for the Carmen Program. Alternatively, the station ceased to 
function as envisaged when it was abandoned. In any event, exceptio non 
adimpleti contractus justifies Amestonia’s non-performance of its 
obligations. Furthermore, the treaty was suspended due to material breach or 
was invalid due to fraud. Riesland violated provisions of the Broadcasting 
Treaty essential to its object and purpose. Riesland had the intention to do so 
at the time the treaty was concluded and thereby induced Amestonia’s 
agreement. Finally, the Voice of Riesland was not entitled under international 
law to State immunity from domestic jurisdiction because international law 
does not require immunity for corporations, even if they are state-owned. 
Even if the VoR was entitled to immunity, it waived that immunity by opting 
into an alternate regime. 
 
 
2016] Distinguished Brief 195 
 
 
 
THIRD PLEADING 
Riesland’s detention of Joseph Kafker under the Terrorism Act violated 
numerous provisions of the ICCPR. Riesland violated Article 9 by detaining 
Kafker without adequately informing him of the reasons for his detention, for 
impermissible reasons, unnecessarily, and without prompt appearance before 
a judge. Kafker was entitled to a fair hearing in accordance with the 
provisions of Article 14, which Riesland violated by depriving Kafker of his 
rights to counsel, equality of arms, review by a higher tribunal, and trial 
without undue delay. Riesland was not entitled to derogate from its 
obligations under Article 4 because it did not provide notification of the 
provisions from which it derogated, the circumstances did not justify 
derogation, the circumstances did not justify derogation, the rights in 
question are non-derogable, and the derogation was not strictly required by 
the exigencies of the situation. The laws of armed conflict do not apply, and 
in any event would not absolve Riesland of its human rights obligations.  In 
addition to compensation, Amestonia is entitled to the release of Kafker and 
the disclosure of information relating to his apprehension, both of which 
remedies are within this Court’s power to order. 
 
FOURTH PLEADING 
The cyber-attacks against The Ames Post and Chester & Walsingham 
are attributable to Riesland and constitute an unlawful act for which 
Amestonia is entitled to compensation. The evidence indicates that the 
attacks were carried out by the government of Riesland or by a person or 
entity acting under its control. In any event, because Riesland had an 
obligation to exercise due diligence in preventing the attacks and failed to do 
so, it is responsible for a breach of its international obligations. The attacks 
constitute an unlawful use of force, a violation of the principle of non-
intervention, a violation of the customary norm of good neighborliness, and 
a violation of Article 17 of the ICCPR. Furthermore, the attacks are not 
justifiable under international law because they were not a valid exercise of 
the right to self-defense and because they were not valid countermeasures. 
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PLEADINGS 
I. THE DOCUMENTS PUBLISHED ON THE WEBSITE OF 
THE AMES POST ARE ADMISSIBLE AS EVIDENCE 
BEFORE THE COURT; RIESLAND’S MASS ELECTRONIC 
SURVEILLANCE PROGRAMS AGAINST AMESTONIAN 
PUBLIC FIGURES AND NATIONALS REVEALED IN 
THOSE DOCUMENTS VIOLATE INTERNATIONAL LAW; 
AND AMESTONIA IS THEREFORE ENTITLED TO AN 
ORDER DIRECTING THE IMMEDIATE CESSATION OF 
THOSE PROGRAMS WITH ASSURANCES OF NON-
REPETITION. 
A. The Frost Files are admissible before this Court. 
1. This Court’s rules of evidence do not provide 
for the exclusion of relevant leaked documents. 
This Court may exercise jurisdiction over “the existence of any fact 
which, if established, would constitute a breach of an international 
obligation.”1 This Court frames its own procedural rules regarding matters 
under its jurisdiction.2 The ICJ Rules of Court and Practice Directions limit 
the admissibility of evidence only when evidence is untimely,3 irrelevant,4 or 
submitted by certain non-parties.5 Accordingly, this Court has never 
excluded evidence on the grounds of unreliability6 or unlawful procurement.7 
Instead, this Court has assigned evidence weight based on its reliability and 
probative value.8 Though international criminal courts may exclude 
                                                        
1 Statute of the International Court of Justice (1945), 59 STAT. 1055, [hereinafter “I.C.J. Statute”], 
Art.36(2)(c). 
2 I.C.J. Statute, Art.30. 
3 I.C.J. Rules of Court, I.C.J. Acts and Documents No. 6 (2007), [hereinafter “I.C.J. Rules”], Art.56; 
I.C.J. Practice Directions, I.C.J. Acts and Documents No. 6 (2007), Dir. IX. 
4 I.C.J. Rules, Arts.63, 79, 84. 
5 I.C.J. Practice Directions, Dir. XII. 
6 Markus Benzing, Evidentiary Issues in THE STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE: 
A COMMENTARY (Zimmermann et al., eds. 2012), 1254; Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Fact-Finding in the Case 
Concerning the Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Republic of Mali) in FACT-FINDING BY INTERNATIONAL 
TRIBUNALS (Lillich ed. 1991), 83. 
7 Hugh Thirlway, Dilemma or Chimera?—Admissibility of Illegally Obtained Evidence in 
International Adjudication, 78 AM. J. INT’L L. 621, 624 (1984). 
8 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (D.R.C./Uganda), Judgment, 2005 I.C.J. 168, ¶59; 
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua/U.S.), Merits, 1986 I.C.J. 14, 
¶¶60, 68, 84-85; Corfu Channel Case (U.K./Alb.), Merits, 1949 I.C.J. 4, 7. 
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unreliable evidence, fact-finding before these courts entails substantially 
different procedures from fact-finding before this Court.9 
 
2. Even if reliability is a basis for exclusion, the 
Frost Files are sufficiently reliable. 
Some international courts find leaked documents unreliable and thus 
inadmissible when their content is contested or unverifiable.10 In contrast, 
courts find leaked documents reliable and admit them when their content is 
“susceptible of confirmation”11 and includes “detail that tallies perfectly 
with…the rest of the record.”12 The Frost Files bear “sufficient indicia of 
credibility,”13 as they are highly-detailed primary-source materials that 
include dates, include names, and are on official letterhead.14 They have been 
confirmed by third-party authentication and subsequent investigation.15 
Riesland has implicitly admitted the Frost Files’ accuracy by charging Frost 
with theft.16 
 
3. The Frost Files’ history of procurement does 
not preclude admissibility. 
This Court17 and a majority of international courts18 have never 
excluded unlawfully-obtained evidence from the record. Even if this Court 
were to exclude unlawfully-obtained evidence, the illegality of the 
procurement of the Frost Files is a matter of Rieslandic domestic law, not 
international law, the subject of ICJ jurisdiction.19 
B. Riesland’s surveillance programs violated international 
                                                        
9 Rosalyn Higgins, Speech, G.A. Sixth Committee (2 November 2007). 
10 Ayyash et al., Decision on the Admissibility of Documents Published on the Wikileaks Website, 
STL-11-01, ¶¶40,42. 
11 Prosecutor/Taylor, Decision of 27 January 2011, SCSL-03-01-T-1171, 4-5. 
12 ConocoPhillips Company et al./Bolivarian Rep. of Venezuela, Dissenting Opinion of Georges 
Abi-Saab, [ICSID] No.ARB/07/30, ¶59 (2013); Prosecutor/Gotovina and Markac, Decision of 2 October 
2012, [ICTY] IT-06-90-A, ¶26. 
13 Prosecutor/Gotovina and Markac, ¶26. 
14 Compromis, ¶23. 
15 Compromis, ¶¶22, 27; Clarifications, ¶2. 
16 Compromis, ¶¶24, 31. 
17 Thirlway, 624. 
18 William Worster, The Effect of Leaked Information on the Rules of International Law, 28 AM. 
U. INT’L L. REV. 443, 456-463 (2013). 
19 I.C.J. Statute, Art.36. 
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law. 
1. Riesland’s surveillance programs breached its 
ICCPR obligations. 
The ICCPR, to which Riesland and Amestonia are parties, prohibits 
“arbitrary or unlawful interference” with individuals’ privacy and 
correspondence,20 and applies to mass surveillance, electronic interception of 
communications, and storage of personal data.21 
 
a. The ICCPR applies to Riesland’s surveillance 
programs. 
States must respect the rights of individuals “subject to [their] 
jurisdiction,”22 regardless of territorial borders.23 Jurisdiction is non-spatial24 
and may arise as a function of cyber-interferences.25 Extraterritorial 
jurisdiction exists when a state’s actions “produce effects outside its 
territory.”26 Extraterritorial jurisdiction can arise from the confiscation of a 
passport,27 failure to provide state-owed pensions,28 or arrest of an 
individual.29 This Court has found that the ICCPR applies extraterritorially 
when a State’s security forces occupied an area.30 Riesland’s programs, by 
                                                        
20 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1976), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter 
“I.C.C.P.R.”], Art.2(1). 
21 HRC General Comment No.16 (1988), U.N.Doc.HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1, ¶¶8,10; The Right to 
Privacy in the Digital Age, U.N.Doc.A/RES/68/167 (2003), Preamble. 
22 I.C.C.P.R., Art.2(1). 
23 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 
Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, ¶111; Armed Activities, ¶220; HRC General Comment No.31 (2004), 
U.N.Doc.CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13, ¶10; Marko Milanovic, Human Rights Treaties and Foreign 
Surveillance: Privacy in the Digital Age, 56 HARV. INT’L L. REV. 81,109-110 (2015). 
24 Montero/Uruguay, U.N.Doc.CCPR/C/OP/2, ¶5 (1990); Al-Skeini et al./U.K., [ECtHR] 53 EHRR 
589, ¶¶133-137 (2011).  
25 European Parliament Report on the ECHELON System, Gerhard Schmid, Special Rapporteur 
(2001), ¶8.3.2; TALLINN MANUAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER WARFARE 
(Schmitt, ed. 2013), [hereinafter “Tallinn Manual”], Rule 2. 
26 Drozd and Janousek/France and Spain, [ECHR]14 EHRR 445, ¶91 (1992); Salas and 
Others/U.S., [IACHR] No.10.573, ¶2 (1994). 
27 Montero/Uruguay, ¶5. 
28 Gueye et al./France, U.N.Doc.CCPR/C/35/D/196/1985, ¶¶9.4-9.5 (1989). 
29 Lopez Burgos/Uruguay, U.N.Doc.CCPR/C/13/D/52/1979, ¶¶12.2-12.3 (1981). 
30 Wall Opinion, ¶111; Armed Activities, ¶220. 
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impacting millions of Amestonians,31 established a jurisdictional relationship 
between Riesland and surveilled Amestonians. 
Even if this Court finds that jurisdiction requires a spatial relationship, 
Riesland owned and operated VoR premises, was afforded territorial 
protections on VoR premises,32 and staffed the VoR with its agents. Riesland 
therefore exercised effective control over VoR premises,33 where the Carmen 
Program unlawfully collected and stored Amestonian data. 
 
b. Arbitrary or unlawful interferences violate 
ICCPR Article 17. 
In determining whether surveillance violates the ICCPR, courts 
frequently consider whether interferences pursue legitimate aims, are 
proportionate to those aims, and accord with sufficiently-limiting domestic 
law.34 
i. The interferences had no 
legitimate aim. 
Vague political and economic interests cannot justify interference.35 
National security concerns only justify interference when a State’s existence, 
territorial integrity, or political independence is threatened.36 The purpose of 
the Carmen Program was to protect political and economic interests,37 and 
the purpose of the Verismo Program was to promote Rieslandic national 
security.38 As Riesland faced no major security threats,39 neither program had 
legitimate aim. 
 
                                                        
31 Compromis, ¶2, 22. 
32 Broadcasting Treaty, Art.1(2), 14. 
33 See M./Denmark, No.17392/90, ¶1 (ECtHR 1992); Harold Koh, Memorandum Opinion on the 
Geographic Scope of the ICCPR, 7 (19 October 2010). 
34 HRC Gen. Comm. 16, ¶4; Lars Rehof, Article 12 in THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS: A COMMENTARY (Eide et al., eds. 1992), 189-190 (quoting New Zealand representative); 
MANFRED NOWAK, U.N. COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 291 (2005); Toonen/Australia, 
U.N.Doc.CCPR/C/50/D/488/1992, ¶6.4 (1994) 
35The Right to Privacy in the Digital Age, Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights 
[UNHCHR], U.N.Doc.A/HRC/27/37, ¶22 (2014). Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and Derogation 
Provisions in the I.C.C.P.R., [hereinafter “Siracusa Principles”], U.N.Doc.E/CN.4/1985/4 (1985), 
Limitation Clauses; European Convention on Human Rights (2010), 213 U.N.T.S. 221, Art.8. 
36 Siracusa Principles, Prins.29-32. 
37 Compromis, ¶26. 
38 Compromis, ¶¶31, 35. 
39 See infra §III.A.3.b. 
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ii. The interferences were 
disproportionate to legitimate 
aims. 
Neither surveillance program had a legitimate aim,40 rendering 
proportional surveillance impossible. Beyond this, the use of “mass 
interception capabilities” is per se disproportionate.41 The Verismo 
Program’s violation of millions of Amestonians’ rights was disproportionate 
to Riesland’s national security concerns, particularly as Amestonia is 
Riesland’s ally and the program predates Hive eco-activism.42 
 
iii. The SSBA provided insufficient 
limitations on interferences. 
Domestic laws governing interferences must: (1) narrowly tailor 
interferences to specific aims; (2) precisely dictate boundaries regarding 
permissible circumstances for interferences, authorization processes, 
categories of susceptible persons, and procedures for storing collected data; 
and (3) provide safeguards against abuse.43 The SSBA provides for broad, 
rather than tailored, programs, gives Rieslandic politicians discretion over 
where, how, and on whom data are collected and stored, and does not require 
notification of surveilled persons.44 The SSBA Tribunal and Committee were 
inadequate safeguards, lacking expert input and never challenging programs’ 
lawfulness.45 
 
2. Riesland’s Carmen Program violated the 
Broadcasting Treaty. 
Article 23(1) requires that VoR employees “respect the laws and 
regulations” of Amestonia.46 The Carmen Program, through which VoR 
employees conducted domestically-unlawful surveillance, contravenes this 
provision. Article 23(2) requires that VoR premises not be used in any 
                                                        
40 See supra §I.B.1.b.i. 
41 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of 
Opinion and Expression, U.N.Doc.A/HRC/23/40, ¶¶37, 62 (2011). 
42 Compromis, ¶¶7, 13, 22. 
43 Right to Privacy in the Digital Age (UNHCHR), ¶28; Bakhtiyari/Australia, 
U.N.Doc.CCPR/C/79/D/1069/2002, ¶9.6 (2003); Weber and Saravia/Germany, 2006 ECHR 1173, ¶¶79, 
84, 93-95. 
44 Compromis, ¶5. 
45 Compromis, ¶23. 
46 Broadcasting Treaty, Art.23(1). 
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manner “incompatible” with VoR functions “as envisaged in the treaty.”47 
Espionage is incompatible with the VoR’s functions as a vehicle for 
advancing inter-State friendship.48 Furthermore, the element of 
“incompatibility” in near-identical provisions in the VCDR49 and VCCR50 
refers to activity that violates the receiving State’s laws and to acts that fall 
outside the typical, designated functions of the mission.51 Both concerns are 
implicated here, as the Carmen Program violated Amestonian law and falls 
outside the designated functions of the premises as a broadcasting station. 
 
3. Riesland’s surveillance programs violated 
Amestonian territorial integrity. 
The sovereign equality of States, enshrined in U.N. Charter Article 
2(1),52 constitutes a basic international law principle. Sovereign States “may 
not exercise…power in any form” in the territory53—which encompasses 
cyber-infrastructure54—of another State. Peacetime espionage, including 
cyber-espionage targeting cyber-infrastructure,55 conducted within another 
State constitutes a violation of territorial integrity,56 as evidenced by State 
                                                        
47 Broadcasting Treaty, Art.23(2). 
48 See infra §II.A.1. 
49 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (1964), 500 U.N.T.S. 95, [hereinafter, “V.C.D.R.”], 
Art.41(1). 
50 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (1967), 596 U.N.T.S. 261, [hereinafter, “V.C.C.R.”], 
Art.55(1). 
51 EILEEN DENZA, DIPLOMATIC LAW: COMMENTARY ON THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON 
DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS 471 (2008); B.S. MURTY, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF DIPLOMACY: THE 
DIPLOMATIC INSTRUMENT AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER, 417 (1989); Martin Den Heijer, Diplomatic 
Asylum and the Assange Case, 26 LEIDEN J. OF INT’L. L. 399, 413. 
52 Charter of the United Nations (1945), 1 U.N.T.S. XVI, Art.2. 
53 S.S. Lotus (Fr./Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser.A) No.10, 18. See also Declaration on Principles of 
International Law Concerning Friendly Relations, U.N.Doc.A/Res/25/2625 (1970), Art.1. 
54 Tallinn Manual, Rule 1.  
55 Michael Schmitt, Cyber Activities and the Law of Countermeasures in Rights and Obligations 
of States in Cyberspace in PEACETIME REGIME FOR STATE ACTIVITIES IN CYBERSPACE (Ziolkowski, ed. 
2013), 665-666; Ashley Deeks, An International Legal Framework for Surveillance, 55 VA. J. INT’L L. 
291, 305 (2015); Wolff Heinegg, Legal Implications of Territorial Sovereignty in Cyberspace in 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 4TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON CYBER CONFLICT, 14-15 (Czosseck et al., 
eds. 2012). 
56 Questions Relating to the Seizure and Detention of Certain Documents and Data (Timor-
Leste/Australia), Memorial of Timor-Leste, ¶3.4 (2014); Quincy Wright, Espionage and the Doctrine of 
Non-Intervention in Internal Affairs in ESSAYS ON ESPIONAGE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (Stranger ed. 
1962), 12; JOHN KISH, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ESPIONAGE 83-84 (Turns, ed. 1995); Manuel Garcia-
Mora, Treason, Sedition and Espionage as Political Offences Under the Law of Extradition, 26 U. PITT. 
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condemnations of such espionage.57 Even if limited espionage is lawful, 
extensive espionage, such as that conducted by Riesland,58 is not.59  
 
4. Riesland’s Carmen Program violated the 
immunities afforded U.N. representatives. 
 U.N. representatives are entitled to “inviolability for all papers and 
documents,”60—including protection from cyber-operations61—and to 
secrecy in voting.62 Riesland’s surveillance of U.N. Ambassador Cornwall, 
which collected information regarding Amestonia’s General Assembly 
votes,63 was therefore unlawful. 
 
C. Amestonia is entitled to immediate cessation and a 
guarantee of non-repetition of Riesland’s surveillance 
programs. 
Because the storage of Amestonians’ personal data constitutes a 
continuing wrong,64 Amestonia is entitled to cessation of Riesland’s 
surveillance programs. A guarantee of non-repetition is necessary when risk 
of repetition is high.65 Given Riesland’s public support for its programs66 and 
technological sophistication, indicating high likelihood of repetition, a 
guarantee of non-repetition is necessary.  
II. THE DETENTION AND ARREST OF VOR EMPLOYEES, 
AND THE SEIZURE AND FORFEITURE OF THE VOR 
FACILITY AND EQUIPMENT, DID NOT VIOLATE THE 
BROADCASTING TREATY OR AMESTONIA’S OTHER 
INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS.   
A. The privileges and immunities provided under the 
                                                        
L. REV. 65, 79-80 (1964). 
57 U.S.S.R. Draft Resolution, U.N.S.C., U.N.Doc.S/4321 (23 May 1960) (Condemning incursions 
by American surveillance U-2s), Art.1; Condemnation of U.S. Espionage in Mercosur States, 
MERCOSUR/PM/SO/DECL.07/2014 (10 November 2014). 
58 Compromis, ¶¶22, 25-26. 
59 See Terry Gill, Non-Intervention in the Cyber-Context in PEACETIME REGIME, 225-226. 
60 Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations (1946), 1 U.N.T.S. 15, Art.4. 
61 Tallinn Manual, Rule 84. 
62 G.A. Rules of Procedure, U.N.Doc.A/520/Rev.17 (2007), Rules 30, 88, 92, 103. 
63 Compromis, ¶26. 
64 Compromis, ¶36; See Rainbow Warrior Case (Fr./N.Z.), 82 I.L.C. 499, ¶114 (1990). 
65 Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex./U.S.), Judgment, 2004 I.C.J. 121, ¶¶150-153. 
66 Compromis, ¶31. 
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Broadcasting Treaty terminated pursuant to Article 36. 
1. The station ceased to function as envisaged in 
the treaty when it became the headquarters of 
the Carmen Program.   
Broadcasting Treaty Article 36 states, “[A]ll privileges and immunities 
provided for in this Treaty, save for those in Article 15(1)(c) above, shall 
cease to have effect upon the cessation of the station’s functions as envisaged 
in the Present Treaty.”67 The VCLT requires treaties to be “interpreted in 
good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms 
in their context and in light of its object and purpose.”68 The context within 
which treaties are to be interpreted includes the treaty’s text (both the body 
and the preamble) and any other relevant, applicable rules of international 
law.69  
The Broadcasting Treaty’s object and purpose is the fortification and 
reinforcement of decades of friendly relations between Amestonia and 
Riesland through the operation of the broadcasting station.70 The preamble 
recognizes the parties’ “desir[e] to fortify the friendship between the two 
countries” and “recognit[ion of] the importance of understanding and 
cooperation between their peoples.”71 The treaty’s text also supports this 
reading, balancing the extension of privileges and immunities with the duty 
to respect the laws and regulations of the receiving state.72  In interpreting 
object and purpose, this Court has recognized parties’ intent to promote 
friendship, cooperation, and mutual understanding achieved through the 
specific field the treaty addresses, and that the “friendship” provisions of a 
preamble should be “regarded as fixing an objective, in the light of which the 
other Treaty provisions are to be interpreted and applied.”73  
The station’s functions are therefore best understood as broadcasting 
television in service of “fortify[ing] the friendship between the two 
countries.”74 Interpreting the station’s functions as synonymous with merely 
broadcasting would be wholly inconsistent with the treaty’s object and 
purpose. When the station began to function as a façade for a hostile and 
                                                        
67 Broadcasting Treaty, Art.36. 
68Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969), 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, [hereinafter “V.C.L.T.”], 
Art.31(1). 
69 V.C.L.T., Art.31. 
70 Compromis, ¶6; Broadcasting Treaty, Preamble. 
71 Broadcasting Treaty, Preamble. 
72 Broadcasting Treaty, Arts.14, 15, 23, 36.  
73 Oil Platforms (Iran/U.S.), Preliminary Objection, 1996 I.C.J. 803, ¶28; Nicaragua, Merits, ¶273. 
74 Broadcasting Treaty, Preamble. 
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illegal espionage scheme against Amestonia, it ceased to “function as 
envisaged” as a vehicle promoting friendship and cooperation, and the 
privileges and immunities provided under the Broadcasting Treaty 
terminated pursuant to Article 36.  
 
2. Alternatively, the station’s functions ceased 
when its broadcasting was interrupted and its 
premises abandoned. 
Even if “cessation of the station’s functions” merely means “cessation 
of broadcasting,” the station ceased to function as envisaged when VoR staff 
cut the television broadcasting and abandoned the station.75 The attempt by 
VoR employees, including the station’s head, to flee Amestonian territory 
that night demonstrates that the employees did not intend to return and 
resume the broadcast.76 No warrant was provided for the seizure of VoR 
property until after the station had cut its broadcast,77 and upon execution of 
the warrant Amestonian police confirmed that the premises had been 
abandoned by the staff.78 
 
3. Articles 14(1-3) and 15(1)(a-b) constitute 
“privileges and immunities” within the meaning 
of Article 36. 
The rights and privileges enumerated in Article 15 are explicitly labeled 
“immunities and privileges.” Further, Article 36’s explicit exception of 
Article 15(1)(c) illustrates that 15(1)(a) and (b) are clearly within Article 36’s 
ambit. Though Article 14 does not explicitly use the label “privileges and 
immunities,” it uses the same language in Article 14—“shall be 
inviolable”—as does Article 15.79 Article 14 also says VoR employees “shall 
be immune,” clearly indicating intent to confer an “immunity.”80 This 
reading comports with the ordinary meaning of “privileges and 
immunities.”81 
                                                        
75 Compromis, ¶¶25-27. 
76 Compromis, ¶28. 
77 Compromis, ¶27. 
78 Compromis, ¶27. 
79 Edward Gordon, The World Court and the Interpretation of Constitutive Treaties, 59 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 794, 814 (1965)(A “rule of interpretation constantly mentioned by the Court is…that a treaty 
must be read as a whole…to avoid inconsistency.”). 
80For other treaties using the language “shall be immune” to confer an “immunity,” see, e.g., 
V.C.D.R., Art.22; V.C.C.R., Art.31; Convention on Special Missions (1985), 1400 U.N.T.S. 231, Art.4.  
81 "Immunity, n." O.E.D. ONLINE, December 2015, Oxford University Press (“Freedom from… 
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4. The former VoR employees do not retain 
functional immunity pursuant to Article 
15(1)(c) with respect to the acts at issue. 
VoR employees were not immune from arrest under the functional 
immunity extended under Article 15(1)(c), which provides, “In respect of 
acts performed by an employee of the station in the exercise of its functions, 
the immunities and privileges shall continue to subsist after the employee’s 
functions at the station have come to an end.”82 The unlawful actions for 
which the VoR staff members were detained and arrested—initially failing 
to present travel document, and subsequently espionage83—were plainly not 
“in the exercise of [the station’s] functions”84  
 
B. In any event, the treaty was not in effect at the time of 
the arrest of the VoR employees and the seizure and 
forfeiture of the VoR facility and its equipment. 
1. The Broadcasting Treaty was invalid due to 
fraud. 
The VCLT states, “A party which has been induced to conclude a treaty 
by the fraudulent conduct of another negotiating State may invoke the fraud 
as invalidating its consent to be bound by the treaty.”85 The term “fraud” 
includes “any false statements, misrepresentations or other deceitful 
proceedings”86 by a State meant to induce consent to a treaty. More 
succinctly, “[f]raud is the antithesis of good faith.” 87 
From its inception, the VoR station was used to “gain an advantage to 
the detriment of”88 Amestonia.89 Only seven months elapsed between the 
signing of the treaty and the first broadcast.90 During that period, Riesland 
built an extensive covert facility underneath the broadcasting station and 
                                                        
jurisdiction, etc… esp. from prosecution or arrest.”). 
82 Broadcasting Treaty, Art.15.  
83 Compromis, ¶28. 
84 Broadcasting Treaty, Art.15; see supra §II.A.1. 
85 V.C.L.T., Art.49. 
86 Commentaries on the Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties, ILC Yearbook (1966-II), 
[hereinafter “V.C.L.T. Commentaries”], Art.46 Cmt.3. 
87 VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES: A COMMENTARY 839 (Dörr et al. eds., 2012).  
88 Dörr, 839.  
89 Compromis, ¶25.  
90 Compromis, ¶¶7-8. 
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installed and developed the necessary equipment to conduct surveillance on 
VoR guests.91 Planning for this elaborate operation certainly began before 
the time the treaty was concluded. The Court may draw adverse inferences 
from circumstantial evidence where direct evidence is in the exclusive 
control of the other party.92 Signing the treaty in bad faith constitutes a 
misrepresentation by Riesland that induced Amestonia to consent to its 
conclusion. 
 
2. Alternatively, Riesland’s violations of the 
Broadcasting Treaty constitute a material 
breach. 
VCLT Article 60 provides that “the violation of a provision essential to 
the accomplishment of the object or purpose of the treaty” constitutes 
grounds for its suspension.93 This requires inquiry into the character of the 
provision(s) breached and their relationship to the treaty’s object and 
purpose.94  Material breaches can result from violations of ancillary 
provisions considered by a party to be essential to the object and 
purpose.95Amestonia’s failure to initiate VCLT termination or suspension 
procedures before now does not preclude its claiming prior material breach 
in response to Riesland’s allegations.96 Further, having made notification 
through these proceedings, Amestonia need not continue performing its 
obligations.97  
Riesland’s violations of Article 23(1) and 23(2) of the Broadcasting 
Treaty98 amount to material breaches. These provisions are essential to the 
object and purpose of the treaty because they represent reciprocal obligations 
due the receiving state.  
Riesland’s illegal espionage scheme, carried out by VoR employees 
over the course of more than two decades under the direction of the Bureau,99 
demonstrates blatant and calculated disrespect and disregard for Amestonia’s 
                                                        
91 Compromis, ¶¶25. 
92 Corfu Channel, 18.  
93 V.C.L.T., Art.60.  
94 Bruno Simma and Christian Tam, Reacting against Treaty Breaches in OXFORD GUIDE TO 
TREATIES (Hollis, ed. 2012), 582-583.  
95 V.C.L.T. Commentaries, Art.7 Cmt.9. 
96 V.C.L.T., Art.65(5); V.C.L.T. Commentaries, Art.62 Cmt.8.  
97 E.J. De Aréchaga, International Law in the Past Third of a Century, 159 RCADI 59, 81 (1978). 
98 See supra §I.B.2. 
99 Compromis, ¶¶25-26.  
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laws in contravention of Article 23(1).100  Further, the use of the VoR 
premises as the headquarters of the Carmen Program, to Amestonia’s 
detriment,101 constitutes a significant breach of Article 23(2).102    
 
3. Amestonia’s non-performance of the treaty was 
justified by exceptio non adimpleti contractus. 
Exceptio non adimpleti contractus dictates that “in an agreement 
creating reciprocal obligations, one Party cannot obtain from the other the 
execution of its obligation, if it does not respect its own commitment”103 and 
follows from the contractual nature of treaties.104 Modern scholars regard 
exceptio as an “implied promise of reciprocity” contained within treaties 
imposing synallagmatic—or intertwined—obligations.105 Exceptio is a 
defense and requires no procedures or prior notifications to invoke it.106 
As argued above, Riesland violated its obligations under Article 23. 
This provision represents the mutual obligations of the parties governing 
appropriate uses of the station and is synallagmatic with the special status 
conferred to the premises. Therefore, Amestonia was justified in its non-
performance of Article 15. 
 
C. Amestonia’s actions concerning VoR property and 
personnel did not violate Amestonia’s other obligations 
under international law. 
1. The VoR is not entitled to State immunity under 
customary international law. 
Though States themselves enjoy immunity from other States’ domestic 
                                                        
100 Broadcasting Treaty, Art.23.  
101 Compromis, ¶¶25-26. 
102 Broadcasting Treaty, Art.23. 
103 Joseph Nisot, L’exception ‘non adimpleti contractus’ en droit international, 74 RGDIP 668, 
668 (1970). See also, Diversion of Water from the Meuse (Netherlands/Belgium), Dissenting Opinion of 
Judge Anzilotti, 1937 P.C.I.J. (ser.A/B) No.70, 49-50. 
104 Appeal Relating to the Jurisdiction of the ICAO Council (India/Pakistan), Separate Opinion of 
Judge De Castro, 1972 I.C.J. 46, ¶2 n.1.  
105 D.W. Greig, Reciprocity, Proportionality and the Law of Treaties, 34 VA. J. INT’L L. 295, 400 
(1994); James Crawford and Simon Olleson, The Exception of Non-performance: Links between the Law 
of Treaties and the Law of State Responsibility, 21 AUSTRALIAN YIL 55, 55-58 (2000). 
106 ELISABETH ZOLLER, PEACETIME UNILATERAL REMEDIES: AN ANALYSIS OF 
COUNTERMEASURES 15 (1984); Application of the Interim Accord of 13 September 1995 
(Greece/FYROM), Counter-memorial of Greece ¶8.26 (2010).  
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jurisdiction under customary international law,107 there is no customary 
international law obligating the extension of immunity to state-owned 
corporations and entities.108 The practice of treating state-owned corporations 
as “instrumentalities” of the state, subject to the presumption of sovereign 
immunity,109 is solely a feature of some States’ domestic laws, not a 
customary norm.110 Other States only grant immunity to state-owned entities 
for acta jure imperii,111 and others do not extend sovereign immunity at all 
to separate legal entities.112 During the drafting of the U.N. Convention on 
Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property, States expressed 
divergent views on whether state-owned corporations with separate legal 
personalities could avail themselves of State immunity, reflecting diverse 
domestic practices.113 
Therefore, as supported by scholarly opinion,114 insufficient State 
practice and opinio juris115 exists to indicate crystallization of a norm 
entitling state-owned corporations to immunity. Both approaches are 
therefore in line with international law obligations, and a State is entitled to 
deny immunity to foreign State-owned corporations in accordance with its 
own domestic law.116 Riesland National Television is a State-owned 
corporation with a separate legal personality,117 and the VoR is a division of 
that corporation.118 Therefore, Amestonia is in observance of its international 
law obligations in denying jurisdictional immunity to the VoR. 
 
2. Alternatively, Riesland waived State immunity 
with respect to the VoR by opting into an 
                                                        
107 ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 99-101 (2005).  
108 XIAODONG YANG, STATE IMMUNITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 278-279 (2015).  
109 E.g., Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. §1602–1611 (U.S.), §1603(b). 
110 See, e.g., OBB Personenverkehr AG/Sachs, 136 S.Ct. 390 (2015) (U.S.). 
111 State Immunities Act, 1978 c. 33, pt. I (U.K.), §14. 
112 See, e.g., Central Bank of Nigeria Case, 65 I.L.R. 131 (Germany, 1975) (“Separate legal entities 
of a foreign State enjoy no immunity.”). 
113 Report of the Working Group on Jurisdictional States and their Property, ILC Yearbook (1999-
II), ¶¶61-83; United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property (2005), 
44 I.L.M. 801 (U.N.Doc.A/59/22), Art.2. 
114 Yang, 279; HAZEL FOX & PHILIPPA WEBB, THE LAW OF STATE IMMUNITY 353 (2008); David 
Stewart, Current Developments: The UN Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their 
Property, 99 AM. J. INT’L LAW 194, 199 (2005). 
115 North Sea Continental Shelf (Germany/Denmark, Germany/Netherlands), Merits, 1969 I.C.J. 3, 
¶77.  
116 Lotus Case, 18. 
117 Compromis, ¶40 
118 Compromis, ¶8. 
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alternate regime under the Broadcasting 
Treaty. 
A State entitled to immunity in a foreign court may waive that 
immunity, either explicitly or by implication.119 Once waived, immunity 
cannot be reasserted.120  Waiver, whether implicit or explicit, must clearly 
express an intention to waive, and that waiver must be specific to the 
litigation at issue.121  
The Broadcasting Treaty provided a detailed immunities regime,122 
including circumstances for termination of immunities.123 Opting into this 
regime evinces a clear intention to submit to the domestic jurisdiction of the 
receiving State if the circumstances provided are met.124 This interpretation 
comports with a well-recognized canon of treaty construction125 by 
preventing surplusage. If Article 36 did not express an intent to waive 
immunity, Articles 14 and 15 would be inoperative, as many of the 
immunities—extant under customary international law—provided therein 
would be redundant. Furthermore, Article 36 would be inoperative, as the 
termination of the treaty-provided immunities would have no practical effect 
on the VoR’s legal status. 
 
 
 
III. THE DETENTION OF JOSEPH KAFKER UNDER THE 
TERRORISM ACT VIOLATED INTERNATIONAL LAW, 
AND AMESTONIA IS THEREFORE ENTITLED TO HIS 
IMMEDIATE RELEASE, THE DISCLOSURE OF ALL 
INFORMATION WHICH FORMED THE BASIS OF HIS 
APPREHENSION, AND THE PAYMENT OF 
COMPENSATION FOR HIS DETENTION. 
A. Riesland’s detention of Kafker violated international 
law. 
Amestonia may bring a diplomatic protection claim on behalf of a 
                                                        
119 Yang, 316. 
120 Fox & Webb, 376-377. 
121 MALCOLM SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 740-741 (2008). 
122 Broadcasting Treaty, Arts.14, 15. 
123 Broadcasting Treaty, Arts.14, 15, 36. 
124 Broadcasting Treaty, Art.36.  
125 GIDEON BOAS, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 65 (2012).  
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national injured by an internationally wrongful act126 who has exhausted 
domestic remedies.127 Kafker, an Amestonian citizen, exhausted domestic 
remedies by appealing to Riesland’s highest court.128 In human rights cases 
relating to detention, “presumptions apply in favour of the ostensibly weaker 
party” and against the State possessing information about the detention.129 
Because Riesland admits possession of “closed materials” on Kafker’s 
detention,130 it must affirmatively demonstrate the detention’s legality. 
 
1. The detention violated Article 9 of the ICCPR. 
Arbitrariness under Article 9(1) encompasses both violations of Article 
9’s procedural guarantees and broader concepts like “inappropriateness, 
injustice, lack of predictability and due process of law…reasonableness, 
necessity and proportionality.”131 It applies to all deprivations of liberty,132 
even those carried out in full compliance with domestic law.133 The court may 
consider procedural deficiencies cumulatively.134 
 
a. Riesland did not inform Kafker of the reasons 
for his detention. 
Section 3(a) of the Terrorism Act provides that suspected “terrorist 
act”135 involvement is grounds for detention up to 180 days. During that 
period, every 21 days a hearing must determine whether the conditions 
requiring detention—“reasons of national security and public safety,” 
including consideration of a non-exhaustive list of six factors in Section 
3(d)—have changed. After 180 days, however, Section 3(h) allows the 
detention to be extended to 540 total days “in appropriate circumstances.” 3 
                                                        
126 Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions (Greece/U.K.), Judgment No.2, 1924 P.C.I.J. (ser.B) No.3, 
12. 
127 See, e.g., Arhuacos/Colombia, UN.Doc.CCPR/C/60/D/612/1995, ¶8.2 (2003). 
128 Compromis, ¶33.  
129 Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Guinea/D.R.C.), Separate Opinion of Judge Trindade, 2010 I.C.J. 347, 
¶73. 
130 Compromis, ¶36. 
131 HRC General Comment No.35 (2014), U.N.Doc.CCPR/C/GC/35, ¶12. 
132 HRC General Comment No.8 (1982), U.N.Doc.HRI/GEN/1/Rev.6, ¶1. 
133 A./Australia, U.N.Doc.CCPR/C/59/D/560/1993, ¶9.5 (1997). 
134 Diallo, Merits, 2010 I.C.J. 639, ¶82. 
135 As defined in the Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (2000), 2178 
U.N.T.S. 197, [hereinafter “C.S.F.T.”], Art.2.1(b). 
2016] Distinguished Brief 211 
 
 
 
September 2015 marked 180 days since Kafker’s arrest on 7 March 2015.136 
 Even if Kafker was informed that he was detained under the 
Terrorism Act, Riesland did not provide him any “factual specifics” of the 
basis for his detention, as Article 9(2) requires.137 Whether Kafker surmised 
the basis himself is irrelevant.138 Further, the Terrorism Act provides “vague 
and expansive” grounds for detention, contrary to Article 9.139  The HRC has 
previously noted the potential illegality of arrests under domestic laws for 
“extremist activity,”140 “terrorism,”141 and “national security.”142 The 
exceedingly vague “appropriate circumstances” criterion under which 
Riesland has held Kafker since 3 September is manifestly unlawful. 
 
b. Riesland is detaining Kafker for impermissible 
reasons. 
Detentions are arbitrary when made for improper purposes,143 including 
suppression of political expression,144 use of detainees as bargaining chips,145 
and retribution for third-party actions.146 The circumstances of Kafker’s 
arrest—his speech on environmental law and online activism, his opposition 
to neonics,147 and Amestonia’s arrest of VoR employees less than three 
weeks before—strongly suggest that Riesland detained him to silence his 
advocacy and to retaliate for Amestonia’s VoR investigation.  
 
c. Kafker’s detention is not reasonably necessary. 
Even if Riesland did detain Kafker for legitimate security reasons, it 
                                                        
136 Compromis, ¶32. 
137 HRC Gen. Comm. 35, ¶25; Ilombe and Shandwe/D.R.C., U.N.Doc.CCPR/C/86/D/1177/2003, 
¶6.2 (2006). 
138 Akwanga/Cameroon, U.N.Doc.CCPR/C/101/D/1813/2008, ¶7.4 (2011). 
139 HRC Gen. Comm. 35, ¶38. 
140 HRC Concluding Observations: Russian Federation, U.N.Doc.CCPR/C/RUS/CO/6, ¶24 (2009). 
141 HRC Concluding Observations: Mauritius, U.N.Doc.CCPR/CO/83/MUS, ¶12 (2005). See also 
HRC Concluding Observations: Bosnia and Herzegovina, U.N.Doc.CCPR/C/BIH/CO/1, ¶18 (2006) 
(“public security”). 
142 HRC Concluding Observations: Sudan, U.N.Doc.CCPR/C/79/Add.85, ¶13 (1998). 
143 See, e.g., Hassan/United Kingdom, [ECtHR] No.20750/09, ¶85 (2014). 
144 Blanco/Nicaragua, U.N.Doc.CCPR/C/51/D/328/1988, ¶10.3 (1994); Castells/Spain, [ECtHR] 
14 EHRR 445, No.11798/85, ¶48 (1992). 
145 Anon./Minister of Defense, [S.C. Israel] 54(1) P.D. 721, 743 (2000). 
146 Yklymova/Turkmenistan, U.N.Doc.CCPR/C/96/D/1460/2006, ¶7.2 (2009). 
147 Compromis, ¶¶32, 36. 
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must provide specific reasons for the measures.148 Riesland bears the 
burden—increasing with the length of detention—of proving a “present, 
direct, and imperative threat”149 that cannot be addressed by “less intrusive 
means,”150 such as regular court proceedings.151 Even States that permit 
preventive detention routinely handle eco-terrorism using standard criminal 
law.152 Riesland’s sole justification—the “integrity of particular intelligence 
sources”153—is vague, common to many criminal investigations, and 
unpersuasive in light of the subsequent revelation of the sources of 
intelligence on Kafker’s activities.154 Riesland offers no evidence that Kafker 
is likely to commit new crimes, destroy evidence, or receive amnesty in 
Amestonia. Finally, laws permitting detention for evidence-gathering in 
relation to suspected terrorism typically limit the period of detention to a few 
days or weeks,155 which Riesland has not shown to be insufficient. 
 
d. Kafker was not brought promptly before a 
judge. 
Article 9(3)’s requirement of prompt appearance in person156 before a 
judge protects those arrested but not yet charged.157 302 days after Kafker’s 
arrest (at time of writing), Riesland has not permitted him to appear in person 
before a court or to communicate to the court through his lawyer. Even if his 
lawyer’s appearance at the hearing on 10 March was an adequate substitute, 
                                                        
148 NOWAK, 382. 
149 HRC Gen. Comm. 35, ¶15.  
150 C./Australia, U.N.Doc.CCPR/C/76/D/900/1999, ¶8.2 (2002). 
151 Benhadj/Algeria, U.N.Doc.CCPR/C/90/D/1173/2003, ¶8.8 (2007); Madani/Algeria, 
U.N.Doc.CCPR/C/89/D/1172/2003, ¶8.7 (2007). This requirement also stems from the rule that “similar 
cases be dealt with in similar proceedings” under Article 14(1) and 14(3). See HRC General Comment 
No.32 (2007), U.N.Doc.CCPR/C/GC/32, ¶14; Evelyne Schmid, A Few Comments on a Comment, 14 
INT’L J. HUM. RIGHTS 1058, 1062 (2010). 
152 See, e.g., Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act, 18 U.S.C. §43 (USA); Serious Organised Crime 
and Police Act of 2005 (U.K.). 
153 Compromis, ¶34. 
154 Compromis, ¶37. 
155 CLAIRE MACKEN, COUNTERTERRORISM AND THE DETENTION OF SUSPECTED TERRORISTS, 2-3 
(2011). 
156 HRC Gen. Comm. 35, ¶42; Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any 
Form of Detention or Imprisonment, U.N.Doc.A/RES/43/173 (1988), Prin.32(2). 
157 Schweizer/Uruguay, U.N.Doc.CCPR/C/17/D/66/1980, ¶19 (1982); de Morais/Angola, 
U.N.Doc.CCPR/C/83/D/1128/2002, ¶6.4 (2005). 
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delays of greater than 48 hours—including three-158 and four-day159 delays—
“are absolutely exceptional and must be justified under the circumstances.160 
Riesland has given no justification for failing to bring Kafker before a judge 
on or before 9 March, when the 48-hour window expired. 
 
2. The detention violated Kafker’s fair trial rights 
under Article 14. 
Article 14 applies to the “determination of any criminal charge.” If the 
“purpose, character, or severity” of the sanction is penal in nature, domestic 
law cannot avoid Article 14’s procedural protections by characterizing a 
detention as non-criminal.161 Kafker’s arrest and detention on suspicion of 
“instigating, authorizing, planning, financing, carrying out, or aiding a 
Terrorist Act”162—which is a domestic criminal offense163—demonstrates 
the penal nature of the sanction. Violations of discrete provisions of Article 
14 may constitute violations of Kafker’s broader rights to a fair trial and 
presumption of innocence enshrined in Article 14(1).164 Furthermore, 
detention following an unfair trial is arbitrary under Article 9.165 
 
a. Riesland deprived Kafker of his right to 
counsel. 
 Article 14(3)(b) entitled Kafker to communicate with counsel of his 
choosing during hearings before the Tribunal. Kafker’s counsel was not 
permitted to consult or otherwise share information with Kafker166 and was 
chosen from a list compiled by the very agency conducting the 
investigation.167 
 
                                                        
158 Hammel/Madagascar, U.N.Doc.CCPR/C/29/D/155/1983, ¶19.4 (1990). 
159 Freemantle/Jamaica, U.N.Doc.CCPR/C/68/D/625/1995, ¶7.4 (2000). 
160 HRC Gen. Comm. 35, ¶33; Abramova/Belarus, U.N.Doc.CCPR/C/107/D/1787/2008, ¶¶7.3–7.5 
(2013). 
161 Perterer/Austria, U.N.Doc.CCPR/C/81/D/1015/2001, ¶9.2 (2004); Fardon/Australia, 
U.N.Doc.CCPR/C/98/D/1629/2007, ¶7.4 (2010). 
162 Terrorism Act, §3(a). 
163 Terrorism Act, §3(d)(4); C.S.F.T. Art.4(a). 
164 See Alegre/Peru, U.N.Doc.CCPR/C/85/D/1126/2002, ¶7.5 (2005); Barney/Colombia, 
U.N.Doc.CCPR/C/87/D/1298/2004, ¶7.2 (2006); Roque/Peru, U.N.Doc.CCPR/C/85/D/1125/2002, ¶7.3 
(2005); Kulov/Kyrgyzstan, U.N.Doc.CCPR/C/99/D/1369/2005, ¶8.7 (2010). 
165 HRC Gen. Comm. 35, ¶17. 
166 Compromis, ¶33. 
167 Terrorism Act, §3(i). 
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b. Riesland deprived Kafker of his right to 
equality of arms. 
Kafker had the right to “adequate time and facilities for the preparation 
of his defense” under Article 14(3)(b), to present and examine evidence and 
witnesses under Article 14(3)(e), and to be tried in his presence under Article 
14(3)(d). Article 14(3)(b) entitled Kafker’s special advocate to pre-trial 
access to all government evidence and other information required for an 
effective defense.168 The defense must enjoy the “same legal powers” as the 
government in presenting evidence.169 Kafker and his counsel had only three 
days to prepare a defense prior to the initial hearing did not have access to 
his attorney or to the “closed material” that allegedly provided the basis for 
his detention,170 and did not enjoy the government’s rights to be present, to 
introduce secret evidence, or to offer anonymous testimony.171 He therefore 
could not effectively challenge the grounds for his detention. 
 
c. Riesland deprived Kafker of his right to review 
by a higher tribunal. 
Article 14(5) establishes the right to review by a higher tribunal, 
requiring “full review of the legal and factual aspects” of the lower court’s 
decision.172 Section 3(b) provides that no court other than the Tribunal may 
review the detention of an individual under the Terrorism Act. Accordingly, 
Kafker’s motion challenging the constitutionality of the proceedings was 
denied by the Supreme Court,173 seemingly without review of the evidence 
upon which Kafker was detained. 
 
3. Riesland was not entitled to derogate from its 
human rights obligations. 
The lawfulness of derogations from human rights obligations is 
judicially reviewable.174 Unlike derogations under ECHR Article 15, 
derogations under ICCPR Article 4 are entitled to little or no deference, or 
“margin of appreciation,” in judicial review of the stated basis for 
                                                        
168 Arutyunyan/Uzbekistan, U.N.Doc.CCPR/C/80/D/917/2000, ¶6.3 (2004). 
169 HRC Gen. Comm. 32, ¶39. 
170 Compromis, ¶33. 
171 Terrorism Act, §§3(e), 3(f). 
172 Vázquez/Spain, U.N.Doc.CCPR/C/69/D/701/1996, ¶8.6 (2000). 
173 Compromis, ¶33. 
174 See, e.g., Ireland/U.K., [ECtHR] (ser.A) No.25 (1978), ¶214. 
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derogation.175 
 
a. Riesland did not provide adequate notification 
of derogation. 
On each of the three occasions Rieland issued Terrorism Alerts 
(October 2014, April 2014, and October 2015),176 it failed to inform the U.N. 
Secretary-General of the provisions from which it derogated and the reasons 
for derogation,177 as required by Article 4(3). These failures bar Riesland 
from asserting derogation ex post under Articles 9 and 14.178 
 
b. The circumstances did not justify derogation. 
According to Article 4, States claiming derogation have the burden of 
demonstrating a “public emergency which threatens the life of the nation,”179 
defined by the European Court as “actual or imminent”180 and “exceptional[,] 
affect[ing] the whole population and constitut[ing] a threat to the organised 
life of the community.”181 This standard is higher than, and distinct from,182 
exceptions in the ICCPR for reasons of “national security.”183 Amestonia’s 
claims do not implicate any rights subject to such exceptions. Large-scale 
massacres involving paramilitary groups,184 frequent fatal bombings by 
separatist forces,185 countrywide strikes and protests,186 and violent seizures 
of hundreds of hostages from an embassy187 have been found not to warrant 
                                                        
175 Sarah Joseph, Human Rights Committee: General Comment 29, 2 HUM. RIGHTS L. REV. 81, 86 
(2002); Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights, Derogations from 
Human Rights Treaties in Situations of Emergency, http://www.geneva-
academy.ch/RULAC/derogation_from_human_rights_treaties_in_situations_of_emergency.php. 
176 Compromis, ¶18; Clarifications, ¶7. 
177 Clarifications, ¶7. 
178 See Wall Opinion, ¶127; Weisz/Uruguay, U.N.Doc.CCPR/C/11/D/28/1978, ¶14 (1984); 
Montejo/Colombia, U.N.Doc.CCPR/C/15/D/64/1979, ¶10.3 (1985); JAIME ORAÁ, HUMAN RIGHTS IN 
STATES OF EMERGENCY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 59 (1992).  
179 Silva/Uruguay, U.N.Doc.CCPR/C/23/D/34/1978, ¶8.3 (1981). 
180 Greek Case (Denmark/Greece), [ECHR] 12 Y.B. 1, ¶112 (1969). 
181 Lawless/Ireland, [ECtHR] No.332/57 (A/3), ¶28 (1961). 
182 HRC General Comment No.29 (2001), U.N.Doc.CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11, ¶4.2. 
183 See, e.g., I.C.C.P.R. Art.14(1)(third sentence) (permitting exclusion of the public from trials for 
“national security” and other reasons). 
184 HRC Concluding Observations: Colombia, U.N.Doc.CCPR/C/79/Add.76, ¶25 (1997). 
185 HRC Concluding Observations: United Kingdom, U.N.Doc.CCPR/CO/73/UK, ¶4 (2001). 
186 HRC Concluding Observations: Bolivia, U.N.DocCCPR/C/79/Add.74, ¶14 (1997). 
187 HRC Concluding Observations: Peru, U.N.Doc.CCPR/C/79/Add.67, ¶11 (1996). 
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Article 4 derogations.  
The planned contamination of honey by three college students on 
Amestonian soil—even if it had resulted in “serious bodily injury”188 to some 
consumers—would scarcely have affected the whole population and 
organized life of Riesland, a developed country of approximately 100 million 
people.189 Riesland has made no showing of an actual or imminent 
emergency since the neutralization of that threat on October 21, 2014,190 
despite twice reissuing Terrorism Alerts. 
 
c. The rights in question are non-derogable. 
The rights not to be arbitrarily detained, to fair trial, and to be presumed 
innocent are non-derogable because they are fundamental rights191 and 
because they are essential to protect the ICCPR’s enumerated non-derogable 
rights.192 Thus, while Riesland may be permitted to derogate from certain 
procedural components of these rights, it cannot derogate from the rights 
themselves.193 
d. The derogation was not strictly required. 
Even if some of Riesland’s claimed derogations are lawful, they must 
comply with an objective standard of proportionality,194 which “varies in 
proportion to the seriousness of the terrorist threat.”195 If derogation 
continues for longer than necessary or actions taken under ordinary laws 
would adequately address the threat, derogation becomes unlawful,196 even 
in the wake of a catastrophic terrorist attack.197 In light of the low severity of 
                                                        
188 Clarifications, ¶1. 
189 Compromis, ¶1.  
190 Compromis, ¶19. 
191 Paris Minimum Standards of Human Rights Norms in a State of Emergency, 79 AM. J. INT’L L. 
1072, §§(C)(5)&(7) (1985); Universal Declaration on Human Rights, U.N.Doc.A/810 (1948), [hereinafter 
“UDHR”], arts. 9, 11; American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man (1948), Arts.18, 25, 26. 
192 HRC Gen. Comm. 29, ¶15; Siracusa Principles, Prin.70; Concluding Observations: Israel, 
CCPR/C/79/Add.93, ¶21 (1998); Aksoy/Turkey, [ECHR] 23 EHRR 553, ¶76 (1996). 
193 Clémentine Olivier, Revisiting General Comment 29 of the UNHRC, 17 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 405, 
414 (2004). 
194 Siracusa Principles, Prins.54, 57; Turku Declaration of Minimum Humanitarian Standards, 
U.N.Doc.E/CN.4/Sub.2/1991/55 (1990), Preamble; HRC Gen. Comm. 29, ¶6. 
195 ROSALYN HIGGINS & MAURICE FLORY, TERRORISM AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 229 (1997). 
196 Christopher Michaelsen, Derogating from International Human Rights Norms in the ‘War 
Against Terrorism’?, 17 TERRORISM AND POL. VIOLENCE 131, 141 (2007). 
197 A and Others/Secretary of State for the Home Department, 2004 UKHL 56, ¶43. 
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any threats posed by eco-terrorism against Riesland198 and the importance of 
Kafker’s right to personal liberty, Kafker’s detention pursuant to unfair 
hearings was—or became, upon Riesland’s second and third derogations—
disproportionate. 
 
e. Amestonia’s allegations are unaffected by any 
claims regarding the existence of an armed 
conflict. 
The ICCPR applies in times of war, subject to its usual derogation 
standards.199 In any event, an armed conflict, characterized by the existence 
of organized armed groups engaged in fighting of some intensity,200 is not in 
existence. Rieslandic police—if they were involved—are not an armed 
group201 and did not clash with the disorganized membership of the anti-
neonics movement. Opposition to neonics has consisted of “internal 
disturbances” that do not trigger the application of the Geneva 
Conventions.202 Furthermore, a 70-year-old retiree engaging in political 
activism, who has not taken up arms or engaged in violence, cannot be said 
to have “taken active part in hostilities.”203 
 
B. Amestonia is entitled to Kafker’s immediate release, 
disclosure of information which formed the basis of his 
apprehension, and compensation. 
1. Amestonia is entitled to Kafker’s immediate 
release. 
The obligation to provide an effective remedy under Article 2(3) is non-
derogable.204 Reparation must restore the situation that would have existed 
but for the wrongful acts.205 Release of a detainee is required when no other 
remedy could cure the ongoing harm.206 Article 9(3) provides that detainees 
                                                        
198 See supra §III.A.3.b. 
199 Nuclear Weapons Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, ¶25; HRC Gen. Comm. 35, ¶64. 
200 International Law Association, Final Report on the Meaning of Armed Conflict in International 
Law 2 (2010). 
201 DIETRICH SCHINDLER, THE DIFFERENT TYPES OF ARMED CONFLICTS ACCORDING TO THE 
GENEVA CONVENTIONS AND PROTOCOLS 147 (1979). 
202 Protocol II (1978), 1125 U.N.T.S. 609, Art.1(2). 
203 Fourth Geneva Convention (1949), 75 U.N.T.S. 287, Art.3. 
204 HRC Gen. Comm. 29, ¶14. 
205 Factory at Chorzow (Ger./Pol.), Merits, 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser.A) No.17, 47. 
206 Cagas/Philippines, U.N.Doc.CCPR/C/73/D/788/1997, Individual Opinion of Quiroga and 
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are entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release. This Court has 
previously ordered the release of unlawfully detained persons.207 Mere 
reconsideration would be inappropriate here, given that the detention itself—
not a procedural error during an ongoing, lawful detention208—is unlawful. 
Kafker is therefore entitled to the “most important remedy” for victims of 
indefinite detention:209 restoration of the personal liberty he would have 
enjoyed had he not been arbitrarily detained without a fair hearing.  
 
2. Amestonia is entitled to disclosure of 
information which formed the basis of Kafker’s 
apprehension. 
An effective remedy for arbitrary detention includes the release of 
detailed information relating to the investigation of the detainee.210 When 
detaining individuals for terrorism offenses, Riesland has an additional 
obligation to inform interested States Parties of “the circumstances which 
warrant that person’s detention.”211 Amestonia is therefore entitled to any 
information justifying Kafker’s detention under the Terrorism Act. 
3. Amestonia is entitled to compensation. 
Article 9(5) entitles victims of unlawful detentions to compensation. 
Non-material injury, including mental suffering and reputational harm, is 
compensable under international law;212 it is an “inevitable consequence” of 
wrongful detention, specific proof of which is not required for the injured 
national’s State to receive compensation on his behalf.213 Amestonia is 
therefore entitled to receive compensation for the harm Kafker suffered from 
his unlawful detention. 
 
IV. THE CYBER-ATTACKS AGAINST THE COMPUTER 
SYSTEMS OF THE AMES POST AND CHESTER & 
WALSINGHAM ARE ATTRIBUTABLE TO RIESLAND, 
AND CONSTITUTE AN INTERNATIONALLY WRONGFUL 
ACT FOR WHICH AMESTONIA IS ENTITLED TO 
                                                        
Posada, (c) (1996). 
207 United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S./Iran), Provisional Measures Order 
of December 15, 1979 I.C.J. 7, ¶47. 
208 Cf. Avena, ¶123. 
209 Alfred de Zayas, Human Rights and Indefinite Detention, 87 IRRC 15, 34 (2005). 
210 Aboufaied/Libya, U.N.Doc.CCPR/C/104/D/1782/2008, ¶9 (2012). 
211 Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings (1998), 2149 U.N.T.S. 284, Art.9(6). 
212 Lusitania Cases, 7 R.I.A.A. 35, 40 (1923). 
213 Diallo, Merits, ¶21. 
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COMPENSATION.  
A. The cyber-attacks against the computer systems of The 
Ames Post and Chester & Walsingham are attributable 
to Riesland. 
As President Hale commented in relation to the 22 March 2015 attacks: 
“all of the evidence points back to the Bureau and to Riesland.”214 To the 
extent that additional relevant evidence is under the exclusive control of 
Riesland, the Court may have “more liberal recourse to inferences of fact and 
circumstantial evidence.”215 The limited availability of evidence in cyber-
attacks necessitates a particularly relaxed standard of proof.216 
 
1. The attacks were carried out by the Rieslandic 
governments. 
The conduct of State organs are attributable to that State.217 In the cyber 
context, an “identifying line of code” can serve the same evidentiary function 
as traditional markers of State authority.218 The origination of a cyber-
operation from a government’s technology systems is “an indication that the 
State in question is associated with the operation.”219 Experts from the 
Amestonian Institute of Technology, a highly-regarded research institution 
specializing in computer science,220 found that “significant segments of 
code” in the malware that brought down the computer systems were identical 
to the codes used by the Bureau in the Blaster program,221 traceable to 
Rieslandic governmental computer infrastructures,222 and unavailable to the 
general public,223 strongly suggesting that Rieslandic government used its 
“world-renowned” IT capabilities224 to carry out the attacks. 
                                                        
214 Compromis, ¶39. 
215 Corfu Channel, 18. 
216 Nicholas Tsagourias, Cyber Attacks, Self-Defence, and the Problem of Attribution, 17 J. 
CONFLICT SEC. L. 229, 235 (2012). 
217 Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts [ARSIWA], (I.L.C. 
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218 Michael Gervais, Cyber Attacks and the Laws of War, 30 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 525, 560 (2012). 
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222 Clarifications, ¶9. 
223 Compromis, ¶38. 
224 Compromis, ¶1. 
220 ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 23:1 
 
 
 
The Bureau had a compelling motive to engage once again in covert 
action within Amestonia. Leading up to the cyber-attacks, Frost’s 
disclosures—facilitated and circulated by the victim companies—led to the 
exposure of confidential Bureau information, seizures of Bureau personnel 
and facilities, and Amestonia’s provision of sanctuary to Frost, a former 
Bureau employee whom Amestonia had declined to extradite a mere eight 
days before the attack.225 Rieslandic Attorney General Deloponte also 
pledged that Riesland would not “tolerate the publication of leaked 
confidential information, and that it [would] do whatever is in its power to 
disrupt any further threats to our national security.”226 
 
2. The attacks were carried out by a person or 
entity acting under the control of Riesland. 
Even if the above evidence does not establish that the Bureau carried 
out the attacks, it is sufficient to prove that Riesland exercised control over 
the person or entity carrying out the attacks.227 The standard of “overall 
control” articulated by the ICTY in the Tadić case would attribute a cyber-
attack carried out by private actors to Riesland if it supplied technical and 
organizational support, “even if no specific involvement in the attack can be 
proven.”228 The Court should decline to follow the heightened “effective 
control” test articulated in the Genocide case,229 which is unduly restrictive 
and not reflective of custom.230  
 
B. Riesland’s attacks constitute an internationally 
wrongful act. 
1. The attacks constitute a violation of U.N. 
Charter Article 2(4). 
Whether an act—including a cyber-operation—amounts to an unlawful 
use of force depends on the act’s scale and effects.231 Destruction of life is 
not a prerequisite, provided that the computer-based operation results in 
                                                        
225 Compromis, ¶35. 
226 Id. 
227 ARSIWA, Art.8. 
228 Tsagourias, 237. 
229 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
(Bosnia and Herzegovina/Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, 2007 I.C.J. 43, ¶401. 
230 Antonio Cassese, The Nicaragua and Tadić Tests Revisited in Light of the ICJ Judgment on 
Genocide in Bosnia, 18 EJIL 649, 651 (2007) (collecting cases). 
231 Tallinn Manual, Rule 11. 
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damage that would be illegal if inflicted by military units.232  The loss of an 
object’s functionality constitutes damage if it requires replacement of 
physical components, and some scholars have observed that a “loss of 
usability” alone is sufficient.233 The 22 March attacks against Amestonian 
targets caused tremendous damage of €45-50 million, resulting in data loss, 
disabling of “communication switches,” and damage to “infrastructure,”234 
suggesting damage to the hardware’s functionality235 and other physical 
computing resources. Chester & Walsingham was unable to access its files 
for months and The Ames Post was non-operational for approximately three 
months.236 These large-scale and serious effects would constitute an unlawful 
use of force if caused by military forces and thus are equally prohibited in 
the cyber context.  
2. The attacks constitute a violation of the 
principle of non-intervention. 
Customary international law prohibits coercive intervention in matters 
that the victim State is entitled to decide freely,237 including the use of certain 
coercive economic measures.238 International instruments,239 State 
practice,240 and scholarship241 indicate that cyber-operations—and the 
provision of tools for use in such operations242—may qualify as coercive. 
                                                        
232 Steven Ratner, Self-Defense Against Terrorists: The Meaning of Armed Attack in COUNTER-
TERRORISM STRATEGIES IN A FRAGMENTED INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER (van der Hink & Schrijver, 
eds. 2013), 18. 
233 Tallinn Manual, 108-09. 
234 Compromis, ¶38. 
235 Hardware is defined as “the physical components that comprise a computer system and cyber-
infrastructure.” Tallinn Manual, Glossary, 259. 
236 Compromis, ¶38. 
237 Nicaragua, ¶205. 
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Riesland undertook or supported a cyber-operation against The Ames Post, 
Amestonia’s most widely-circulated newspaper,243 in order to coerce 
Amestonia to submit to Riesland’s demands in two matters Amestonia had 
decided—and was entitled to decide—freely: its refusal to extradite Frost 
under the political offense exception in the Extradition Treaty and its refusal 
to release documents held by The Ames Post.244 
 
3. The attacks constitute violations of Riesland’s 
human rights obligations. 
In addition to ICCPR Article 17’s protection against interference with 
correspondence, Article 19 recognizes the “freedom to seek, receive and 
impart information and ideas of all kinds.” These rights apply to private 
businesses.245 Cyber-attacks against private networks constitute violations of 
these provisions,246 which States have a “positive obligation” to prevent, 
investigate, and punish.247 By interfering with—or failing to protect against 
interference with—the rights of Amestonian corporations to engage freely in 
both private and public correspondence, Riesland violated its obligations 
under the ICCPR.248 
 
C. In any event, the attacks violated Riesland’s obligation 
to prevent transboundary harm. 
States are obligated to prevent activities within their jurisdictions that 
adversely affect other States.249 Although the norm is applied primarily to 
tangible resources, sovereign jurisdiction includes computer infrastructures 
within a state’s territory,250 and the no-harm principle extends to adverse 
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effects in the shared environment of cross-border computer networks.251 
Scholars have argued that Russia be held responsible for the 2007 cyber-
attacks against Estonia, given Russia’s tacit approval of the acts during an 
ongoing dispute with Estonia.252 Statements by State representatives 
regarding operations originating in the territories of Kyrgyzstan, Israel, and 
China show that cyber-attacks are internationally-wrongful acts.253 
Riesland’s refusal to respond to the attacks,254 technological sophistication, 
extensive control over the “primary backbone” Amestonian 
communications,255 and use of Rieslandic IP addresses and government 
software in the attacks show that Riesland failed to exercise due diligence in 
preventing or punishing operations launched from its soil. 
 
D. The attacks are not justifiable under international law. 
1. The attacks were not a valid exercise of the 
right to self-defense. 
a. Self-defense cannot be exercised against non-
State actors. 
This Court256 and scholars257 have found that non-State actors cannot 
commit “armed attacks” under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter; thus, they may 
be targeted without the territorial State’s consent only if their actions are 
attributable to that State. Even if an exception exists for self-defense within 
States “unable or unwilling” to prevent armed attacks,258 that test is not met 
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here. Following the arson attacks, President Hale announced a police 
investigation and emphasized that Amestonia would “not tolerate such 
provocations;”259 Amestonian police later apprehended would-be attackers 
before they could cause any harm;260 finally, no attacks have occurred in 
Amestonia or Riesland since the release of the Frost Files. 
 
b. Riesland was not the victim of an armed attack. 
An armed attack, distinct from “less grave” uses of force,261 requires 
“infliction of substantial destruction upon important elements of the target 
State.”262 If non-State actors can commit armed attacks, a higher threshold 
for what constitutes an “armed attack” applies to them263—which does not 
include extraterritorial terrorist attacks against a State’s nationals.264 Arson 
committed on Amestonian soil, even if two Rieslandic nationals died from 
smoke inhalation, does not satisfy even the most expansive definition of an 
armed attack. Preventive self-defense is not recognized in international law, 
including against terrorist attacks.265 
 
2. The attacks were not valid countermeasures. 
 Countermeasures that violate fundamental human rights 
obligations266 and involve the use or threat of force267 are unlawful.268 
Countermeasures must be necessary “to safeguard an essential interest 
against a grave and imminent peril”269 and proportionate—including 
quantitatively equivalent270—in response to an internationally wrongful act. 
                                                        
Extraterritorial Self-Defense, 52 VA. J. INT’L L. 483 (2012). 
259 Compromis, ¶15. 
260 Compromis, ¶19. 
261 Nicaragua, ¶191. 
262 AVRA CONSTANTINOU, THE RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENCE UNDER CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL 
LAW AND ARTICLE 51 OF THE U.N. CHARTER 64 (2000). 
263 Leiden Policy Recommendations on Counter-Terrorism and International Law in COUNTER-
TERRORISM STRATEGIES IN A FRAGMENTED INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER (2013), Annex, ¶39. 
264 Ratner, 17; Ruys, 175. 
265 YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION, AND SELF-DEFENCE 208 (2005). 
266 See supra §IV.B.3. 
267 See supra §IV.B.1. 
268 ARSIWA, Art.50(1)(a-b). 
269 ARSIWA, Art.25(1)(a); Thomas Franck, On Proportionality of Countermeasures in 
International Law, 102 AJIL 715, 741 (2008). 
270 Enzo Cannizzaro, The Role of Proportionality in the Law of International Countermeasures, 
2001 EJIL 889, 906-07. 
2016] Distinguished Brief 225 
 
 
 
Amestonia’s seizures of VoR personnel and property were lawful.271 In any 
event, Riesland’s rights under the Broadcasting Treaty are not an essential 
interest and could have been asserted without recourse to unilateral action. 
Finally, Amestonia seized property worth only €20 million that has not yet 
been sold;272 by contrast, the Amestonian targets suffered €45-50 million in 
irreversible losses.  
 
E. Amestonia is entitled to compensation for the attacks. 
States are entitled to compensation for breaches of international law 
resulting in harm to property.273 Amestonia is entitled to €45-50 million for 
the harm caused to the two Amestonian companies.274 
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PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
The State of Amestonia respectfully requests this Court to declare: 
I. 
 
The Ames Post documents are admissible, Riesland’s electronic 
surveillance programs violate international law, and Amestonia is entitled to 
their cessation and non-repetition; and 
II. 
Amestonia’s VoR seizures and arrests were lawful; and 
III. 
Riesland’s detention of Kafker violated international law, and 
Amestonia is entitled to his release, disclosure of relevant documents, and 
compensation; and 
IV. 
The cyber-attacks against Amestonian targets are attributable to 
Riesland and constitute a wrongful act for which Amestonia is entitled to 
compensation. 
 
Respectfully submitted, 
Agents of the Government of the State of Amestonia 
 
 
